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## Editor's Notes

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China's relationship with international society has gone through several phases over the past two centuries. Since the shift of policy in the late 1970s away from revolutionism, China and international society are closer now than ever before. But policies that have worked for China since the late 1970s may not be applicable to the next 30 years. In his article *China in International Society: Is 'Peaceful Rise' Possible?*, Barry Buzan proposes that China must now consider the kind of international society and the most desirable regional–global balance it wishes to promote. Continuing a peaceful rise is possible but will not be easy. It requires China to think hard about certain aspects of its national identity, and to take the lead in resolving its troubled relationship with Japan.

The Mencian critique of 'hegemony' in pre-Qin China was intended to substitute a materialist or realist theory based on military power. Jeremy Paltiel's article, *Mencius and World Order Theories* explores the limits of this theory in contemporary international relations. Certain scholars suggest that the absence among China's Asian neighbours of balancing favour demonstrates that the Mencian view of hierarchy, order and interest is understood and accepted in Asia. Others counter that this is the result of China's Bismarkian 'reinsurance' policies, rather than an alternative view of order. The author raises the question of whether or not the dispute can be resolved empirically.

Making monolithic characterizations of the PRC as either cooperative or confrontational, based on China's participation in UN Security Council deliberations on 'pariah' states, is difficult. In Joel Wuthnow's *China and the Processes of Cooperation in UN Security Council Deliberations*, the author assesses the effectiveness of three explanations in accounting for China's mixed record of cooperativeness: the willingness of sponsors to make sufficient concessions, changes in underlying preferences regarding the means and ends of intervention, and the application of political pressure. The author finds that each model can help to explain outcomes, with the qualification that the usefulness of Western pressure is highly limited.

In Zhou Fangyin's article, *Wars of Attrition and the Timing of Peace Settlements*, the author explores two questions: under what circumstances war can be terminated and under what conditions substantive negotiations to end a war can commence. The author argues that information problems in games of wars of attrition are actually driven by future uncertainty.

The players having shared expectations about the outcome of an absolute war approximates a sufficient condition for peace talks to begin. In the game that it develops, such shared expectations are formed through reverse induction. Two case studies, the Thirty Year's War and the First Opium War between England and the Qing Dynasty, are conducted to test the theory.